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RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1230  
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1013  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0810  
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0647  
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0259  
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0132  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000272

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SU](#) [UNSC](#) [KPKO](#)  
SUBJECT: UN/DARFUR: POTENTIAL SYG-DPKO DIVIDE ON DARFUR  
TACTICS

REF: USUN NEW YORK 00268

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR ALEX WOLFF FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

11. (C) SUMMARY. There seems to be a crack of daylight between the thinking of United Nations (UN) Secretary-General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) leadership regarding next steps on dealing with the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU) on Darfur. Despite the hawkish approach that the SYG took with President Bashir at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh, DPKO officials suspect he may ultimately acquiesce to some Sudanese demands on elements of the Heavy Support Package (HSP) of UN assistance to the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS). We need to keep the pressure on the UN leadership to maintain a more offensive posture in its dealings with Bashir. END SUMMARY.

SYG TALKS THE TALK . . .  
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12. (C) On April 4 Ambassador Wolff spoke with Kim Won-soo, Deputy Chief of Staff to SYG Ban, about the SYG's plans vis-a-vis Darfur in the wake of the Arab League Summit last month. Ambassador Wolff emphasized the need for the SYG to build on the momentum created in Riyadh and to maintain sustained pressure on Bashir to uphold his commitments. Kim reported there were already signs of Bashir's backsliding, as evidenced by the "new" communique from the Arab League (reftel), but that the SYG was committed to keeping Bashir's "feet to the fire." Kim assured that the SYG had no intention of using the Tripartite Mechanism as the means of Darfur decision-making, as the new communique suggested. The process, according to Kim, would continue to be agreement by the UN and AU, followed by consultation with the GNU. Kim said Ban was in regular contact with Saudi King Abdullah and had spoken with him earlier in the day. Ban also reportedly plans to call Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa in the coming days. Kim also reaffirmed AU Commission Chair Konare's tough position, which was in lockstep with that of the SYG.

13. (C) In April 5 Security Council consultations, SYG Ban confirmed that the April 9 meeting in Addis was a go. In response to admonishments from Members about Khartoum's stall tactics, Ban stressed repeatedly that the meeting would not

represent a re-negotiation of the HSP but would rather be a clarification session, noting that there was the possibility of an "exchange of views" with the GNU in the process.

. . . BUT PER DPKO, CAN'T WALK THE WALK

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¶4. (C) Kim told Ambassador Wolff that the SYG remains committed to the political process as the primary means of proceeding on Darfur, a commitment which DPKO officials suspect is overriding the SYG's stated firmness with the GNU.

Both Under-SYG Guehenno (please protect) and Assistant-SYG Annabi (please protect) reported to Ambassador Wolff and PolMinsCouns their suspicion that SYG Ban may be more flexible in his dealings with Bashir than he leads on, as his April 5 "exchange of views" comment indicates. Guehenno told Ambassador Wolff that when he urged the SYG to remain firm on the UN position for the April 9 meeting, the SYG replied that he needed more "breathing space." Annabi told PolMinsCouns in a separate April 4 meeting he suspected the SYG might be willing to acquiesce on HSP numbers with Bashir, a suspicion he also relayed to UKUN Permanent Representative and current Security Council President Jones Parry (NOTE: UKUN relayed to Poloff its own suspicions that there was an emerging divide between the SYG and DPKO regarding tactics in Darfur. END NOTE).

¶5. (C) Annabi said that as of April 4, the GNU had still not committed to attending the planned April 9 meeting (NOTE: The meeting has since been confirmed. END NOTE). Given the confusion over the dueling communiques that resulted from the Riyadh Summit, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit was reportedly refusing to attend the meeting, especially if the latest version of the communique would be the basis for discussion. Neither Annabi nor DPKO Africa Division Chief Dmitry Titov were enthusiastic about the prospect of UN attendance at the meeting, but they were

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overruled by the SYG; Titov was designated to attend but as of yet has no marching orders. He assured PolMinsCouns, however, that he had no intention of re-opening the HSP debate with the GNU.

¶6. (C) Annabi was not optimistic that the AU was fully on board with the UN, despite Konare's recent harsh words for Sudan, especially with regard to the hybrid operation. Annabi said Konare's definition of the hybrid "was never 50/50" on shared responsibility with the UN, given Konare's strong stance on AU ownership of Darfur peacekeeping and his sense of superiority regarding the UN (NOTE: Konare will attend an April 16 UNSC briefing only at the invitation of the SYG; Annabi reported Konare had been insulted by the invitation letter sent to him under the Slovakian UNSC Presidency to come to New York. END NOTE). Annabi expressed concern to PolMinsCouns that President Bashir might succeed in an effort to create daylight between the AU and the UN when AU Commissioner Djinnit and Konare travel to Sudan before April 16; Annabi suggested a call from the USG to the AU might help reinforce the AU-UN partnership and tandem approach to Darfur peacekeeping.

¶7. (C) After the April 9 meeting, the next step in New York will be the April 16 informal meeting at which Konare, Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim (as a member of Konare's delegation) will meet with the Council. Annabi hoped that the AU and the UN will have agreed to the full package of Darfur peacekeeping by then, including the thorny issues of command and control and force composition under the hybrid operation.

COMMENT

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¶8. (C) Moving forward on Sudan/Darfur at the Security Council has become a question of picking battles. UKUN, current UNSC President, is hesitant about the idea of a PRST/letter on advancing the HSP at or around the same time as a sanctions

resolution. At April 5 consultations UK Permanent Representative and current SC President Jones Parry announced that the UK and the U.S. would table a sanctions resolution "very soon" because "it was clear that the Security Council has taken the Sudan issue as far as it can." UKUN agrees that if there is movement, however modest, on the HSP, including authorizing the UN to proceed with funding, Sudan-friendly Council Members would block sanctions on the basis that the GNU was now "complying" with Council demands by "allowing" HSP deployment to proceed (even though sanctions would be imposed not for HSP non-compliance but rather for ceasefire violations). UKUN also questions the willingness of troop-contributing countries to commit even if we were to get agreement on a PRST/letter for the HSP, since they would be deploying in a vacuum with no assurance that the hybrid would follow to back them up.

19. (C) Given the tenor of Council discussions, however, and the slow pace at which Members are moving on Darfur, this week is the earliest opportunity we have to move a possible PRST/letter forward. USUN has already discussed with UKUN whether a PRST or a letter would be most appropriate and expeditious in light of the positive initial reports of the April 9 meeting in Addis. In the meantime, we can explore ways of putting Sudan further on the defensive. Perhaps the new-found frustration felt in Riyadh among Arab League members and SYG Ban's recent friendship with King Abdullah could be channeled into a condemnation by the Arab League of Bashir's obstructionism; a similar statement could be sought from the AU. END COMMENT.

WOLFF